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Abstract 
This paper offers an explanation for variations in the effectiveness of trade unions to obtain 
legislative and policy concessions in peak-level tripartite negotiations in post-communist East 
Central Europe. I examine the usefulness of some standard interpretations for such varia-
tions, namely economic-structural arguments, arguments originating in democratization lit-
erature, political cycle arguments, and neo-institutionalist arguments (particularly from the 
corporatist literature). I argue that none of them offers a fully satisfactory explanation for the 
problem at hand. Standard explanations mostly offer static accounts which either neglect the 
importance of key actors’ strategies or assume that these strategies are predetermined. Instead, 
I argue that the sources of these variations are to be attributed to distinct paths of state-labor 
relations which are the product of continuous strategic interactions within the general 
framework of tripartite institutions. To present a mechanism through which these paths 
evolve, this paper sketches a model of government-union interactions that combines institu-
tional and behavioral variables. I propose a set of hypotheses with respect to the conditions 
that determine initial choice of strategies and factors that influence continuation or modifica-
tion of these strategies later on. The paper further illustrates how these interactions shape tri-
partite institutions in such a way that they start reflecting accentuated power disparities be-
tween the contending actors, thereby limiting the scope of future choices for weaker actors. I 
demonstrate how the interplay of the proposed variables has shaped distinct paths of state-
labor relations, and influenced the effectiveness of unions, in the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Poland.  
  
Zusammenfassung 
Das vorliegende Discussion Paper bietet eine Erklärung für den unterschiedlichen Erfolg, mit 
dem Gewerkschaften in Mittel- und Osteuropa in tripartistischen Verhandlungen legislative 
und politische Konzessionen erlangt haben. Hierzu gibt es bereits eine Reihe von gängigen 
Erklärungen, etwa der Verweis auf die Demokratisierungsliteratur, die Betonung von politi-
schen Zyklen oder unterschiedlichen Wirtschaftsstrukturen, aber auch neoinstitutionalisti-
sche Argumente insbesondere aus der Korporatismustheorie. Keiner dieser Ansätze bietet 
aber eine wirklich zufrieden stellende Erklärung für das vorliegende Problem. Die gängigen 
Erklärungen sind meist statisch und messen entweder den von den zentralen Akteuren ver-
folgten Strategien keine große Bedeutung bei oder sehen diese als weitgehend prädetermi-
niert an. Der Aufsatz erklärt Unterschiede im gewerkschaftlichen Erfolg hingegen mit unter-
schiedlichen Entwicklungspfaden der Staat–Gewerkschaftsbeziehungen. Sie sind das Ergeb-
nis fortwährender strategischer Interaktionen innerhalb tripartistischer Institutionen. Ein 
Modell der strategischen Interaktionen zwischen Regierungen und Gewerkschaften erklärt, 
wie sich diese Pfade entwickeln. Das Modell kombiniert institutionelle und Verhaltensvariab-
len und setzt diese in Verhältnis zu einer Anzahl von Hypothesen über die Faktoren, die die 
anfängliche Strategiewahl und spätere Strategiewechsel beeinflussen. Dabei spiegeln tripar-
tistische Institutionen die veränderten Machtverhältnisse zwischen den zentralen Akteuren 
wider, und begrenzen damit auch die Bandbreite zukünftiger Handlungsoptionen schwäche-
rer Akteure. Der Aufsatz zeigt, wie sich durch diese Interaktionen spezifische Entwicklungs-
pfade der Staat–Gewerkschaftsbeziehungen ausbilden, die die Unterschiede in der Durchset-
zungsfähigkeit der Gewerkschaften in der Tschechischen Republik, Ungarn und Polen erklä-
ren. 
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1 Introduction 
Soon after the first democratic elections, virtually all governments in post-com-
munist East Central Europe (ECE) placed the task of building capitalism on top of 
their agendas. International financial institutions and economic advisors widely 
advocated neoliberal economic blueprints as the most efficient way to the desired 
economic system. Consequently, economic packages adopted to facilitate a quick 
transition to capitalism were all based on three essential pillars of reforms: stabi-
lization, liberalization, and privatization. Such neoliberal strategy for economic 
transformation has posed common challenges to organized labor across the re-
gion. The combined effects of stabilization and liberalization quickly led to a 
sharp drop in real wages, while industrial restructuring and privatization endan-
gered job security and led to unemployment. At the same time, restrictive mone-
tary policies left little room for bargaining over wages, while fiscal policy con-
straints eroded the social dimension of reforms by dismantling the universal sys-
tems of social security benefits that were characteristic of the socialist system. 
Thus, soon after the implementation of the reforms, labor in all ECE countries 
was faced with falling standards of living and rising job insecurity.  
In order to prevent a possible backlash against reforms and preserve social peace 
in the face of adverse effects of economic transformation, governments across the 
region initiated the establishment of national tripartite institutions. By comprising 
representatives of government, trade unions, and employers, the institutions of 
tripartite deliberations were expected to build a broad consensus for reforms. The 
formal functions assigned to these bodies at the time of their establishment were 
broadly similar across the region: they were to facilitate consultations and nego-
tiations over broad economic and social policies, and more specific labor issues 
such as wages, employment, and working conditions.  
It is in this similar context – where economic constraints inevitably demand sacri-
fices on the part of labor, but tripartite institutions provide potentially promising 
foundations for a distinct form of governance based on the inclusion of trade un-
ions in the policy process – that one would expect similar outcomes for labor 
across the region. Yet, a closer look at individual country cases reveals important 
variations. Despite very similar formal requirements, both the practical impor-
                                                   
I thank Lucio Baccaro, Helen Callaghan, Martin Höpner, Till Müller-Schoell, Marino 
Regini, and Wolfgang Streeck for their helpful comments and suggestions on this paper. 
In addition, I am particularly grateful to László Bruszt, David Ost, Jonas Pontusson, Ul-
rich Sedelmeier, and Gábor Tóka for numerous comments and constructive criticism of 
my earlier work which served as the basis for this paper. 
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tance and achievements of the institutionalized tripartite negotiations have been 
rather different in different national contexts. Governments neither relied on 
these institutions to the same extent, nor were they equally responsive to union 
demands. Whereas some unions managed to strike deals in these negotiations, 
their counterparts in other countries were mainly informed on already decided 
government policy choices. While some unions were able to obtain certain mate-
rial and legislative concessions for their members, others had to face extreme 
marginalization in national policy making arenas. In essence, this paper seeks to 
offer an explanation for variations in the effectiveness of unions to obtain conces-
sions in national-level tripartite negotiations and represent their members’ inter-
ests.  
I examine the usefulness of some standard interpretations put forward to account 
for similar variations, namely economic-structural arguments; arguments origi-
nating in democratization literature; political cycle arguments; and neo-institu-
tionalist (in particular corporatist theory) arguments. I claim that none of these in-
terpretations alone can offer a fully satisfactory explanation for the problem at 
hand. Their basic shortcoming is that they provide largely static accounts, which 
either entirely neglect the importance of strategies followed by the key actors or 
assume that these are predetermined.  
This paper, in turn, attempts to offer a more dynamic analysis that takes into ac-
count the interplay between political strategies and institutional structures since 
the beginning of transition. I argue that cross-national variations in labor effec-
tiveness are to be attributed to distinct paths of state-labor relations (i.e. incorpo-
ration paths), which are the product of continuous interactions between govern-
ments and trade unions within the general institutional framework provided by 
peak-level tripartite institutions. In order to present the evolution of these paths 
more clearly, the paper sketches a model of government-union interactions which 
identifies conditions that determine initial choice of strategies and factors that in-
fluence continuation or modification of these strategies.  
The paper is organized in the following way. Section two offers a brief account of 
the general impact of transformation on organized labor in ECE countries. The 
discussion of these similar outcomes is then followed by an outline of main varia-
tions in terms of effectiveness of unions in national tripartite negotiations in three 
ECE countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. The third section tests 
four alternative interpretations for these variations. Section four presents the ar-
gument and sketches a model of government-union interactions. The paper con-
cludes by discussing potential contributions of the argument to the question of 
institutional evolution and change.  
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2 The Impact of Post-Communist Transformation on Organized Labor  
2.1 Similar Pressures 
Economic transformation did not only result in drastic falls of real wages and 
high unemployment across the region, but it also confronted trade unions with a 
number of other negative developments. An increasing body of sources on the 
changing labor relations in the region clearly points to the general weakening of 
trade unions reflected in plummeting membership figures; declining coverage by 
collective agreements; and low influence of unions on national public policy mak-
ing (e.g. Crowley 2001; Kubicek 1999; Ost 1997). Due to large structural economic 
changes, as well as widespread perceptions of unions as the “remnants of the old 
system,” union density rates fell dramatically in all post-communist countries. 
Within the first decade of transformation, membership levels dropped from 
around 90% to between 20–35% (Cox/Mason 2000). These developments were 
accompanied by the declining coverage rates of collective agreements and the de-
centralization of collective bargaining. The coverage rates sank from about 100% 
to about 25–30%, placing most ECE countries at the bottom of the coverage scale 
for EU member states (EIRO 2002; Kohl/Platzer 2003). 
A glimpse of hope in this gloomy picture for trade unions in ECE was the estab-
lishment of tripartite institutions in the early 1990s. Encouraged by the ILO, new 
governments initiated the establishment of these institutions in order to obtain 
broad support for the necessary reforms and preserve social stability. In addition, 
the adoption of macro-level corporatist bargaining institutions was perceived as 
an important step in institutional transformation that would help these new de-
mocracies to “join Europe” (Crowley 2001; Pollert 1999). Unions, on the other 
hand, welcomed the institutionalization of tripartism as a means to rebuild their 
legitimacy, but also to be consulted on specific issues related to labor legislation 
and social and economic policy. 
Soon after its initiation, tripartism became one of the central topics in studies that 
deal with labor relations in ECE countries. The question that dominated these 
studies in the 1990s was whether the establishment of tripartite institutions was a 
sign of the potential emergence of corporatism in the region. One group of au-
thors argued that while tripartism might not have produced truly corporatist out-
comes and strong gains for labor, these institutions have nonetheless facilitated 
interest intermediation and helped bring about a broad consensus regarding 
market reforms while preserving social peace (Ekiert/Kubik 1998; Iankova/
Turner 2000). Taking into consideration the depth of the economic crisis in the re-
gion, tripartite social partnerships were successful in that they managed to foster 
communication between social partners and initiate processes that one of these 
authors described as “transformative corporatism” (Iankova 1998).  
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Another, and more widespread view, however, was that tripartite institutions are 
far from being vehicles for corporatist policy making, and that they have been 
used by governments mostly to legitimize their already decided policy choices 
rooted in neoliberal economic principles. If we are to assign any adjectives to the 
term corporatism, these authors argued, it should be “illusory” or “paternalistic,” 
rather than “transformative” (Ost 2000; Tatur 1995). Tripartite institutions in ECE 
did not protect or promote welfare state elements as they did in Western Europe 
(Heinisch 1999; Kubicek 1999), but have merely served as a corporatist façade. 
Most commonly, governments used them instrumentally, as a way of appease-
ment of labor, rather than a forum for proper negotiations over policy proposals 
(Kohl/Platzer 2003). Moreover, tripartite institutions often failed to facilitate con-
sensus, and when they did, the implementation of various agreements was often 
problematic (Orenstein/Hale 2001). Furthermore, it was most often the govern-
ments who failed to stick to certain provisions. 
Thus, most current research on industrial relations in post-communist ECE indi-
cates that transformation has undermined the strength of trade unions in the re-
gion. However, most of the literature on the subject consists of either descriptive 
single-case studies (e.g. Gardawski 2001; Héthy 2001; Kubínková 1999; Tóth 2001) 
or of more general pieces that treat the region as the unit of analysis (Cox/Mason 
2000; Crowley 2002; Kubicek 1999; Ost 2000). Only a handful of more compara-
tive studies point to certain cross-national differences in terms of either the im-
portance assigned to tripartite negotiations, or to the organizational and political 
capacity of unions (Pollert 1999; Orenstein/Hale 2001; Thirkell et al. 1998), but 
even they do not engage into a rigorous comparative analysis that would enable 
them to either systematically define these differences or more clearly conceptual-
ize their causes. Quite unlike the literature on industrial relations in Western 
Europe – where one of the central questions has been whether (and why) similar 
systemic challenges result in different policy outcomes – studies that focus on the 
post-communist ECE have not properly addressed cross-national differences in 
the emerging industrial relations systems. This paper seeks to fill this gap by ad-
dressing the question of cross-country variation in the effectiveness of unions to 
obtain concessions in national-level tripartite negotiations and represent the in-
terests of their members. The next section briefly reviews these differences be-
tween the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to provide a basis for testing 
competing explanations for the observed variation.  
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2.2 Varied Outcomes 
In order to preserve social peace in the face of economic hardships, all post-
communist countries established national-level tripartite institutions in the early 
stages of transformation. By doing so, they sought to show their readiness to in-
volve social partners in the reform process. Yet, in reality not all governments in-
volved trade unions to the same extent. While in some countries unions have 
been included in policy-making from the beginning of transition and have nego-
tiated on a broad range of economic and social policies defining transformation 
strategies, in others they were consulted but allowed to negotiate only on a nar-
row range of issues that directly affect employees, or they were kept outside the 
policy making process altogether until the main set of transformation policies 
was already well under way. In addition, even though the predominant position 
of government in tripartite institutions has been characteristic for all ECE coun-
tries, they have not used these institutions in the same way, or assigned equal 
importance to them.  
For instance, formal authorities and functions assigned to tripartite institutions in 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland were fairly similar at the time of their 
establishment. In all three countries, they enabled social partners to engage in in-
dicative wage bargains on an annual basis, participate in the drafting of labor leg-
islation, and consult and advise government representatives on policies that af-
fect them. However, whereas in Poland this consultation in practice has been fo-
cused on industrial relations and social issues while general economic policies 
were mostly left out, in the Czech Republic and partly in Hungary the tripartite 
consultation involved a broad range of not only labor and social affairs, but also 
general economic policies. In particular, in the Czech Republic the conclusion of 
the first general agreement represented a form of social contract on the main di-
rections of transformation. Moreover, in contrast to other countries in the region, 
the government’s legislative and policy proposals cannot be submitted to Parlia-
ment or enacted through the ministries before they are discussed in the tripartite 
institution (Horalek/Formanova 2002; Orenstein/Hale 2001).  
In addition, the three countries also display significant differences regarding their 
achievements in terms of the number and scope of major agreements between so-
cial partners. While the functioning of tripartism has not been smooth in any of 
the countries under consideration, its effectiveness and the benefits that it has 
produced for organized labor seem to be highest in the Czech Republic. One of 
the most important outcomes of tripartite negotiations at the outset of the 1990s 
was the so-called low-wage and low-unemployment compromise, which became 
the underlying principle of the Czech transformation. The government argued 
that the recipe for successful economic reform had to include wage control and 
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undervalued currency. Low real wages were to keep unemployment down, while 
the undervalued currency was expected to help exports and consequently main-
tain employment (Orenstein 1996). In exchange for direct material sacrifices, the 
unions obtained social policy concessions to cushion the drop in real wages, as 
well as implicit guarantees that there would be no mass lay-offs. While wage con-
trol was a common element of reform packages in all ECE countries, it was the 
acceptance of this policy by trade unions, as well as the negotiated form of the 
main principles of the economic reform, that made the Czech experience distinc-
tive. In addition, the unions managed to use the tripartite institution to negotiate 
and draft the new, largely union-friendly legislation. In particular, the Law on 
Collective Bargaining (1991) was one of the most important achievements for or-
ganized labor as it extended the unions’ collective bargaining powers (Birle 1999; 
Myant/Smith 1999; Pollert 1999). Together with the other labor legislation writ-
ten in accordance with the ILO Conventions, as well as relatively strong protec-
tion against job dismissals, the legal framework of industrial relations in the 
Czech Republic compared to other ECE countries has been rather favorable to un-
ions (Orenstein 1996; Stark/Bruszt 1998). Furthermore, the 1991 General Agree-
ment gave the tripartite Council an additional important role, namely negotia-
tions and supervision of active labor market policies (ALMPs), as well as setting 
up employment offices that were responsible for administering the implementa-
tion of various retraining and job programs. The scope of the ALMPs, as well as 
their assignment to the tripartite institution, was a unique characteristic of the 
Czech system of labor relations (Nesporova 1999). The implementation of the 
measures stipulated by the 1991 Agreement – especially with regard to wages 
and unemployment – was monitored and evaluated annually during the negotia-
tion of subsequent General Agreements.  
In contrast to Poland where annual agreements have usually been only indicative 
wage bargains, or to Hungary where the initially broader scope has been reduced 
with time to merely the determination of the minimum wage and recommenda-
tions on wage increases, the Czech General Agreements are of a much broader 
scope. Their purpose is to set the guidelines for all economic sectors and to agree 
on a number of important issues involving economic and social policy, wage pol-
icy, and ALMPs (Kubínková 1999). Although by 1995, General Agreements had 
been signed for each year, the hostile attitude of the Klaus government, combined 
with privatization scandals and economic downturn, interrupted this practice. 
Nonetheless, since 1998 the situation has improved as the new Social Democratic 
government showed more willingness to negotiate annual General Agreements, 
but also to open lengthy discussions for the conclusion of a long-term social pact 
(European Commission 2002). In addition, the government proved to be respon-
sive to the union’s demands especially with regards to the tripartite negotiations 
over pension reform; the long-awaited amendments of the Labor Code; and the 
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legislation that would ensure the protection of workers in case of insolvency 
(Mansfeldova 2001; Rueschemeyer/Wolchik 1999; Večernik 2001).  
In contrast, tripartite negotiations were less important to the overall transforma-
tion strategy in either Hungary or Poland at the outset of transition. Nonetheless, 
the Hungarian unions managed to use the institution of tripartite deliberations in 
a much more effective way than their counterparts in Poland. In 1990 and 1991 
two important labor disputes, which potentially threatened overall social stabil-
ity, were settled within this institution with an outcome largely favorable to the 
unions.1 Both episodes demonstrated the importance of the relatively new tripar-
tite institution in bringing social partners to the negotiating table and preserving 
social peace (Ladó 1996; Tóth 1998). During the 1991–94 period, tripartite negotia-
tions regularly resulted in annual agreements. However, in contrast to the Czech 
Republic, annual agreements in Hungary are in essence income policy packages 
largely focused on determining the national minimum wage and proposing rec-
ommendations regarding the average, maximum, and minimum growth of gross 
earnings (Héthy 1999). When in 1994 the Socialist-led coalition came to power, 
tripartite deliberations were expected to play a more important role. Indeed, in 
the face of a serious economic crisis, the government proposed the negotiations of 
a broader social pact, but after more than six months of intense discussions, the 
social partners failed to reach an agreement (Héthy 1999; Tóth 1998). Instead of a 
grand corporatist compromise, the government in the end decided to completely 
bypass the tripartite institution and rely on its absolute majority in Parliament to 
unilaterally impose a neoliberal austerity package which entailed a number of 
measures that adversely affected employees (Ost 2000; Toth 2001).2 This instance 
considerably weakened the commitment to social dialogue so that in the follow-
ing two years no general annual agreements were signed.3 An additional blow to 
tripartism came with the 1998 general elections that brought to power another 
conservative government, which completely transformed the tripartite institu-
tional framework. In essence, the role of the unions was limited to discussions of 
strictly labor-related issues, while pre-legislative consultations on the budget and 
general economic policy measures – which had served as a platform for signing 
income policy package agreements during the previous two governments – were 
                                                   
1 The two disputes are most commonly referred to as the “taxi-and-lorry drivers block-
ade” and “the autumn of discontent.” See Héthy (1999).  
2  The most significant of these measures were: the reinstitution of wage controls; an 
increase of both consumer taxes and energy prices; a downward adjustment of the 
social policy budget; and further plans for restructuring of the public sector.  
3  Tripartite cooperation improved slightly in the 1996-97 period when tripartite nego-
tiations resulted in a few legal and administrative changes favorable to the unions. 
However, no significant “material” gains were achieved by organized labor within 
the framework of the tripartite institution.  
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no longer subject to tripartite negotiations. By transforming the institutional 
framework for social dialogue, dismantling the Ministry of Labor, and introduc-
ing certain union-unfavorable amendments to the Labor Code, the government 
clearly showed its intention to diminish the importance of tripartite negotiations 
in the policy making process. Consequently, no important tripartite agreement 
was signed in the 1998–2002 period. The Socialist government that came to power 
in 2002 is showing more commitment to social dialogue. It has re-established the 
tripartite Council and assigned it its original functions. Some agreements with 
public sector unions have also been reached, but negotiations over long-term 
policies for the public sector proved to be a more complicated issue.  
Finally, the record of the Polish tripartite negotiations is undoubtedly the poorest 
among the three cases. For a country with such a strong legacy from the Solidar-
ity movement, this is evidently a puzzling outcome. Indeed, it is due to this leg-
acy that many expected to see the emergence of real corporatist arrangements 
which would promote a form of inclusionary democracy based on a strong input 
of organized labor. However, this is not what happened in Poland. Not only was 
the overall transformation strategy decided upon without structured tripartite 
negotiations, but it was not until 1994 that the national tripartite institution was 
established, and ever since its functioning has been rather problematic. While in 
the Czech Republic this institution helped craft a broad transformation strategy, 
and in Hungary, it at least attempted to facilitate the negotiations of a social pact, 
no such an attempt has been undertaken within the Polish tripartite institution. 
Neither the center-right conservative nor the social-democratic governments 
showed a true commitment to treating institutionalized social dialogue as an es-
sential pillar of the policy making process. Nonetheless, the latter’s stance to-
wards tripartite negotiations has been relatively more positive (Pollert 1999). In-
deed, it was during the first social-democratic government that four annual in-
dicative wage agreements were reached. In contrast, during the center-right gov-
ernment’s term in office (1997–2001), this institution was mostly inactive. Regard-
less of these differences, however, all Polish governments tended to bypass the 
tripartite institution and go directly to parliamentary debates when they saw in-
dications that the unions might not support their legislative and policy proposals. 
Thus, in contrast to the two other countries, the national tripartite institution in 
Poland has never played such an important role in formulating principles of ei-
ther socio-economic policy or collective labor relations (Hausner 1996; Orenstein/
Hale 2001).  
This brief overview of the functioning and results of tripartite practices indicates 
that, despite common pressures associated with transformation, the three cases 
clearly display variations in terms of union effectiveness in using the tripartite 
structures to secure a real input in policy making and obtain concessions for their 
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members. How can we account for these variations? The next section briefly dis-
cusses four possible interpretations, and argues that none of them offers an ade-
quate explanation for the problem at hand. However, while economic-structu-
ralist interpretations, legacy-arguments associated with the democratization lit-
erature, and political-cycle arguments can be readily dismissed, neo-institution-
alist/neo-corporatist arguments – while not fully accounting for the variations – 
can still offer important building blocks for a more comprehensive explanation 
that would take into account both institutional structures and strategies followed 
by the key actors. 
3 Accounting for Variations: Alternative Approaches 
3.1 Economic–Structural Explanations 
These interpretations come in various forms, but they always perceive economic-
structural attributes of specific national contexts as the main determinants of the 
choice of socio-economic policies. For instance, in the economic transition litera-
ture, the starting position of a country in terms of general macro-economic condi-
tions has often been referred to as an important determinant of a specific design 
and speed of economic reforms. According to this interpretation, the more diffi-
cult the economic situation is at the beginning of the transition, the smaller the 
number of policy options that governments can pursue (Blanchard et al. 1991). A 
similar argument can be applied in the case of social dialogue and union effec-
tiveness in using institutions of tripartite deliberations. In this line of reasoning, 
governments that inherit extremely unhealthy economies have their hands tied, 
and are expected to opt for neoliberal economic policies without prior institution-
alized exchange with organized interests.  
Although this could be a reasonable explanation, it nonetheless fails to fully ac-
count for the observed variations in terms of both government readiness to rely 
on social dialogue and union effectiveness in tripartite negotiations. While it is 
true that the first democratic government in Poland inherited a much higher in-
flation rate than the other two countries, other indicators are not so clear cut. 
Even though the level of foreign indebtedness in Poland was much higher than in 
the Czech Republic, Hungary was in the most unfavorable position, and yet the 
first Hungarian government regularly used the tripartite negotiations and, on a 
number of occasions, even ceded to certain union demands. In addition, the 
Czech Republic was not only faced with the highest domestic indebtedness and 
government deficit, but it also had a particularly weak banking system. Neverthe-
less, this obviously did not prevent the establishment of a solid institutionalized 
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tripartite exchange and signing of general agreements of a wider scope.4 More 
generally, however, the trouble with this argument is that its assumption that ini-
tial economic conditions determine the quality of tripartite negotiations and effec-
tiveness of organized labor is too deterministic as it completely neglects the pos-
sibility that strategies of the key actors might not be influenced only by economic 
conditions, but also by the overall balance of power in society. In addition, an 
overemphasis of initial conditions contributes little to understanding outcomes of 
tripartite negotiations and policy processes over more than a decade of transfor-
mation.5  
3.2 The Role of Trade Unions in Regime Change 
A second interpretation for the observed variations can be derived from the de-
mocratization literature. The main focus here is on the legacies of the transition 
process, or more precisely, the role of labor movements in undermining authori-
tarian systems and creating foundations for democracy. For instance, the role of 
trade unions in undermining authoritarian regimes through either strikes or riots, 
or political actions originating in their ties to opposition parties can be seen as the 
main determinants of the position of organized labor once the democratic system 
                                                   
4  In 1990 the inflation rate in the former Czechoslovakia and Hungary was 10.8% and 
28.9% respectively, while the Polish rate – which was comparable only to the Former 
Yugoslavia – equaled 585.8% (World Economic Outlook 1993:94). Total external debt 
in 1991 equaled 29.5% of GNP in Czechoslovakia, while it amounted to 68.5% in Po-
land, and 77% in Hungary (World Development Report 1993: 285). Government defi-
cit as a percentage of GNP in 1990 was 2.4% in Poland, 7.1% in Czechoslovakia, while 
Hungary had a slight positive balance of 0.8% (World Development Report 1992). On 
the starting economic conditions in Hungary and the Czech Republic, see also Stark/ 
Bruszt (1998), and on Poland and the Czech Republic see Orenstein (2001).  
5  An alternative economic-structural explanation could be that it is not only initial 
economic conditions that influence the fate of the unions, but also the changing eco-
nomic conditions over time (I am grateful to Gabor Toka for pointing this out to me). 
Even though the focus here is more on economic cycles, the reasoning is still the 
same: the deeper the economic problems, the weaker the chances for proper tripartite 
bargaining. While this explanation might account for certain episodes of tripartite ex-
change in the individual cases, it cannot be generalized to all the cases and all the pe-
riods of tripartite interactions. For reasons of space, I cannot engage into a detailed 
empirical analysis of the three cases in this paper. However, the empirical record 
clearly shows that the fate of organized labor and the institutionalized tripartite de-
liberations did not always directly depend on the macroeconomic attributes of a 
given period. Indeed, on a number of occasions different governments decided to 
rely on the institutionalized social dialogue during economic difficulties (e.g. the 
Czech Republic 1997-99; Poland 1994-95) and to neglect it during the more prosper-
ous periods (e.g. Hungary 1998-2002; Poland 1997-2001).  
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comes into existence (Foweraker 1987; Rueschemeyer/Stephens/Stephens 1992; 
Valenzuela 1989). A related view emphasizes the inclusion of union representa-
tives in the official negotiations on regime change. If transitions are mainly elite-
driven processes, it is unlikely that interests of labor would be taken into account. 
However, if labor movements manage to secure a place in negotiations – either 
through their historical ties to political parties or independently – outcomes for 
labor are expected to be more favorable since unions have a chance to affect the 
very nature of transition paths (Collier/Mahoney 1997).  
While this interpretation sounds logical and has been proven on a number of 
cases of earlier democratization waves, it completely fails to account for varia-
tions among these three specific cases. Paradoxically, it is in Poland – where the 
Solidarity union was both a crucial force in undermining the Communist Party 
rule and the core of the opposition movement that directly negotiated the transi-
tion to democracy – that the corporatist exchange is the weakest and the unions 
seem to be the most impotent. Indeed, in no post-communist country did an in-
dependent union movement participate so actively in the transition to democ-
racy. Moreover, due to the concessions that Solidarity secured in the 1989 Round-
table talks – such as indexation of wages, certain self-management provisions and 
a wider scope of industrial democracy – analysts widely expected the emergence 
of real corporatist arrangements (Kamiński 1991). In view of this, it is rather puz-
zling how quickly these issues, for which Solidarity fought so hard, were dis-
missed once Solidarity formed its own, first democratic government. Contrary to 
expectations, the new government tried neither to build real corporatist arrange-
ments nor to promote a form of inclusionary democracy based on a strong input 
of organized labor. Instead, it opted for the harshest version of a neoliberal shock 
therapy that resulted in extreme drops of wages and living standards, as well as a 
dramatic increase in unemployment. 
In contrast, trade unions were not the leading force in the Czechoslovak democra-
tization. Moreover, unlike in the case of Solidarity, workers did not play such an 
important role in the Czechoslovak dissident movement, Charter 77 (Orenstein 
2001). The unions did, however, contribute to the fall of the communist regime by 
organizing the general strike of 27 November 1989. While this action was impor-
tant for it gave “the final blow to the communist regime” (Stark/Bruszt 1998: 
183), it was nonetheless only the last one in a series of protests that started with a 
student march ten days earlier. Furthermore, and again in contrast to Poland, the 
Czech unions did not play a role in the following roundtable negotiations on the 
regime change. Thus, according to the hypothesis outlined above, their position 
should have been rather weak as they could not directly influence the nature of 
reforms. Yet, it was precisely this ex-communist, reformed union that managed to 
secure comparatively most concessions in tripartite negotiations over various as-
pects of economic reform.  
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Hence, the explanation that directly links the role of unions in democratization 
with their subsequent fate is incapable of explaining variations among our cases. 
In addition, from a more conceptual viewpoint, this interpretation fails to prop-
erly spell out how these “initial choices” are transmitted to future socio-political 
trajectories. In this way, the position of unions seems to be “crystallized” at the 
onset of transition. However, in order to understand the position of organized la-
bor in the new democracy one needs to extend the time frame from the immedi-
ate process of transition to the whole period of consolidation, and to trace the im-
pact of the ongoing political processes, changing allegiances, and political con-
flicts that continue within the new context.  
3.3 Cyclical Factors: Political Orientation of the Government 
Another interpretation originates in a long and extensive scientific debate that has 
been focused on the relationship between the political orientation of the govern-
ment and the choice of macro-economic policies (see Hicks/Swank 1992; Boix 
2000). The starting model proposed that depending on their political orientation, 
governments are likely to pursue a very different combination of fiscal and mone-
tary policies. Left-wing governments are expected to opt for a Keynesian set of 
policies, while right-wing governments for policies that would ensure a balanced 
budget and low inflation (Hibbs 1977). The literature on social-democratic corpo-
ratism built on this proposition, suggesting that, due to their broad base in organ-
ized labor, left and center-left governments are more likely to pursue welfare 
policies, but also to strengthen the role of the unions in public policy making 
(Cameron 1984; Jessop 1978; Korpi 1983).6 In the same line of reasoning, we 
would expect more conservative, center and right-wing governments to pursue 
less labor-friendly policies and neglect regular negotiations with trade unions.  
This argument could, for instance, account for a more pro-corporatist attitude of 
the social-democratic government in the post-1998 Czech Republic, and a dismis-
sive attitude of the center-right FIDESZ government in Hungary (1998–2002) and 
the AWS government in Poland (1997–2001). However, this proposition also can-
not be generalized to all cases and to all governments. For instance, democratic 
institutions of tripartite deliberations were introduced in both the Czech Republic 
and Hungary not by social-democratic, but by conservative governments. More-
                                                   
6  Social democratic corporatist theory argued further that the success of these policies, 
however, does not depend only on the social-democratic participation in the gov-
ernment, but also on the existence of institutionalized centralized bargaining mecha-
nisms (Garrett/Lange 1989; Alvarez et al. 1991) and/or strong, centralized unions 
that can ensure the wage moderation (Goldthorpe 1984).  
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over, for the good part of their terms in office, these governments actively used 
these institutions. As mentioned earlier, it was at the beginning of the 1990s when 
conservative governments were in power in both countries, that the unions man-
aged to bargain more actively and, especially in the case of the Czech Republic, to 
achieve important concessions. While the social-democratic government formally 
established the Polish tripartite institution in 1994, the initial proposal for its crea-
tion came within the Pact on State Enterprises that was negotiated during the first 
Solidarity government. Even though social-democratic governments in Poland 
were not so adverse to the idea of the institutionalized tripartite exchange as the 
respective Solidarity-led governments, they nonetheless either did little to pro-
mote regular negotiations when they ran into trouble, or they relied on their ma-
jority in Parliament to pass policies and laws that were not approved in tripartite 
negotiations. Finally, the most striking example that clashes with the outlined 
proposition is the already mentioned case of Hungary where the first Socialist 
government (1994–98) opted for a unilateral introduction of a comprehensive 
neoliberal austerity package.  
Thus, the proposition that links labor outcomes with political orientation of par-
ties in power seems to be too simplistic to account for the observed variations. On 
a more general level, by assuming pre-determined strategies of political actors, 
this interpretation fails to recognize that the practical impact of these cyclical 
changes is conditioned by contextual factors (such as economic and political con-
straints) and/or specific institutional configurations. 
3.4 Institutional Differences 
The final set of interpretations for cross-national variations in union ability to ob-
tain concessions is focused on different institutional characteristics, especially the 
organizational structure of trade unions and the existence of institutionalized, 
formal links between organized labor and political parties. The first argument, in 
particular, has been at the very core of neo-corporatist theorizing (Schmitter/
Lehmbruch 1979; Goldthorpe 1984; Golden 1993). According to this argument, it 
is the number of union centers that determines the bargaining power of organ-
ized labor. A more encompassing, centralized and concerted union structure is 
expected to benefit organized labor since it minimizes coordination problems and 
facilitates formulation of a common bargaining strategy. In the same line of rea-
soning, a fragmented union structure weakens the bargaining power of organized 
labor as various unions might have different demands or prefer different meth-
ods for achieving their goals. Hence, according to this argument, the negative ef-
fect of transformation on union power in the ECE countries should be higher in 
cases where national labor movements are more fragmented.  
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This interpretation fits the case of the Czech Republic, which managed to retain 
the most centralized trade union structure. The whole trade union scene is domi-
nated by the ČMKOS, the reformed confederation having its origins in the former 
communist trade union of Czechoslovakia. The so-called new unions were nei-
ther as abundant nor as influential as in Poland or Hungary. Such a structure of 
organized labor has indeed proven to be a beneficial element in the bargaining 
process within the national tripartite institution. However, while this corporatist 
argument seems to correspond to the Czech case, it fails to explain variations be-
tween Hungary and Poland, both of which have fragmented labor movements. In 
particular, the Hungarian trade union scene is extremely fragmented. Six union 
confederations represent employees in the national tripartite institution. Four of 
them have their roots in the old communist union (MSZOSZ, SZEF, ESZT and 
ASZSZ), while the two others (LIGA and MOSZ) were established as anti-
communist, alternative unions. The trade union scene in Poland has been domi-
nated by the two largest, strikingly opposing organizations – NSZZ Solidarity, 
and the successor union, the OPZZ. Thus, in both cases, national labor move-
ments are fragmented, but as the more empirical part of this paper indicates, the 
Hungarian unions managed to use the tripartite institution in a more effective 
way than their Polish counterparts. Moreover, the fact that organized labor in 
Hungary, which is characterized by a pluralistic model of unionism, fares better 
than in Poland, where the structure of organized labor is largely bi-polar, does 
not fit the hypothesis that links the degree of union fragmentation with union 
power and effectiveness in national-level bargaining.  
Therefore, the degree of union fragmentation alone cannot account for the ob-
served variation. While this variable is undoubtedly important, the sole focus on 
the structural characteristics of organized labor indicates only an approximate, 
potential union bargaining power. In order to understand variation in union abil-
ity to obtain concessions in tripartite negotiations, these structural attributes need 
to be complemented with more attitudinal or behavioral characteristics. More 
precisely, what is needed – in addition to the organizational structure – is to ex-
amine whether (and to what extent) the mode of interaction between the unions 
can be characterized as cooperation or rivalry and competition. For instance, or-
ganized labor in both Hungary and Poland is fragmented, but the mode of inter-
union dynamics has been significantly different. While inter-union conflicts have 
been evident in both cases, their intensity as well as the reasons that underpin 
them differ considerably. In Hungary, these conflicts have been mainly focused 
on organizational issues (such as the redistribution of the “old” union’s assets), 
though political differences also played an important role in the first half of the 
1990s. Throughout the past decade, rivalry and competition between the confed-
erations precluded a more serious attempt to outline a common strategy. It was 
only recently – after the last conservative government tried to further weaken the 
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unions by formally curtailing the power of the tripartite institution and introduc-
ing union-adverse amendments to the Labor Code – that some signs of union co-
operation first appeared.7 In contrast, conflicts between the two main confedera-
tions in Poland have been of much higher intensity. While organizational issues 
played a role, the main dividing points have been of ideological and political na-
ture. The irreconcilable political differences and extreme hostility between the 
two Polish confederations have impeded any form of collaboration and seriously 
eroded the overall capacity of organized labor in tripartite negotiations. Hence, 
the degree of fragmentation alone can tell us little about union capacity for effec-
tive bargaining without a more detailed examination of inter-union dynamics.  
The final interpretation originates in the work of scholars who argued that a high 
degree of union centralization might be an important but not sufficient condition 
for achieving concessions for organized labor. What unions need, these authors 
argued, is institutionalized, formal ties to political parties (in particular social 
democratic parties) who would advance their interests (Esping-Andersen/Korpi 
1984; Higgins 1985; Stephens 1979). In its simplest form, the argument is that 
connections between trade unions and political parties enhance the political 
power of labor and strengthen its influence in policy making. In this way, unions 
are able to secure favorable policies and legislative reforms and further enhance 
their position in society. Indeed, the experience of some advanced countries 
shows that historically such links have benefited organized labor (Huber/Ste-
phens 2001). Labor-based parties promoted a generous welfare state, and helped 
unions obtain a wide range of policies and programs that would “shield workers 
from biographical and market exigencies” (Pieven 1992: 5). Hence, the basic 
proposition here is: the stronger the union-party ties, the higher the potential 
benefits for organized labor. 
However, the experience of post-communist trade unions seems to suggest ex-
actly the opposite. The evidence of the three cases examined in this paper indi-
cates that organized labor achieved more not in the countries where unions were 
drawn into the political sphere through formal links with political parties, but 
rather where they managed to preserve their independence. Indeed, in Poland, 
where organized labor has been most ineffective in influencing socio-economic 
policies and reforms, unions have cherished the strongest formal links with the 
                                                   
7  The leaders of individual union confederations openly admitted that the prolonged 
inter-union conflicts have negatively affected their ability to successfully represent 
their members’ interests, and presented respective governments with the opportu-
nity to minimize labor’s say in the tripartite institution (Polgár 2002). As a result, they 
committed themselves to promoting inter-union cooperation and jointly demanded 
the re-establishment of the tripartite Interest Reconciliation Council with its original 
functions. The proposal was adopted in July 2002 by the current Socialist govern-
ment.  
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leading political parties. The successor union OPZZ has been a part of the social-
democratic SLD, while the Solidarity union – as the core of the former opposition 
movement – has been an essential component of anti-communist, conservative 
parties, in particular the AWS. These ties enabled unions to have a significant 
number of representatives in parliament. In addition, the fact that a trade union 
leader served as a President during a crucial period of transformation (1990–
1995), and that a number of trade union officials obtained high political posts in 
both conservative and social-democratic governments indicates the extent of poli-
ticization of the Polish unions. In contrast, the central Czech union confederation, 
which has managed to obtain some important legislative and policy concessions, 
has always explicitly insisted on its formal political non-alignment despite its 
general social-democratic orientation. Finally, the union-party links in Hungary 
are much more complicated than in the other two cases. Out of the six main con-
federations, the biggest one (MSZOSZ) has developed close links with the social-
ist party (MSZP). The two new unions, LIGA and MOSZ, have been more am-
biguous in terms of political ties – initially they were connected with the liberal 
and conservative parties, but later on distanced themselves from them. The three 
remaining successor confederations have not been politically aligned. It is inter-
esting to note, however, that the most radical neoliberal set of economic policies 
was accepted during the socialist government when a number of MSZOSZ repre-
sentatives served as MPs on the list of the socialist party.  
Thus, there seem to be significant differences in the way these partnerships have 
worked in the West as opposed to the East. I would argue that the main reason 
that union-party links do not benefit labor in post-communist ECE is related to 
the very character of social-democratic and/or labor-based parties, and conse-
quently to the very nature of their ties with trade unions. The argument that these 
ties can be beneficial for labor originates primarily in the experience of Northern 
European social democracy where these partnerships have been historically and 
institutionally the strongest. Throughout the decades of close cooperation, these 
relationships have generally assumed the form of interdependence. In some cases 
unions even founded these parties and supported them not just with their votes, 
but also with financial contributions (Beyme 1985; Western 1997). The parties, in 
turn, advocated specific legal, material, and political concessions for their allies, 
thus facilitating the strengthening of unions. Although these partnerships were 
put under increasing pressure associated with de-industrialization and globaliza-
tion processes, they have nonetheless survived, albeit in a somewhat modified 
form (Esping-Andersen 1999).  
In contrast to such a nature of union-party links in the West, their relationship in 
ECE can best be described as a form of inverse dependency relationship, in which po-
litical parties have always been the strongest partner. Rather than relying on the 
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exclusive support of trade unions, social democratic parties in post-communist 
ECE have implemented from the very beginning more opportunistic strategies by 
creating institutional as well as informal links not only to organized labor, as the 
main loser of transformation, but also to other groups in society. Due to negative 
connotations assigned to the unions, these parties had to play very cautiously so 
as not to be perceived as the sole representatives of the “remnants of the old sys-
tem.” Consequently, they designed their programs in a way that could appeal to 
a much broader electorate. Organized as “political Noah’s Ark,” these parties 
thus bare little resemblance to their Western counterparts (Orenstein 1998). In 
addition, serious economic problems and the much needed support of interna-
tional financial institutions led to the endorsement of neoliberal economic princi-
ples. In general, the neoliberal approach was perceived as the quickest, and often 
the only, way to break with the past and “catch up with Europe.” Consequently, 
the distinction between social democratic and center-right parties in terms of eco-
nomic policies became increasingly blurred.  
In contrast to West European countries, formal ties with unions and the inclusion 
of their leaders in parliamentary politics in ECE have largely been a token gesture 
by political parties and governments who intended not only to preserve this 
“electoral asset,” but also to control organized labor and minimize its influence 
over policy making so that they could conform to the widespread political climate 
and secure a position in the realm of democratic politics. Moreover, in countries 
where union-party ties were extremely strong – as in the Polish case – unions not 
only failed to achieve considerable concessions for employees, but they even 
worked as “reform advocates” (Meardi 2002), propagating the idea that tough 
economic measures are in the long-term interest of workers. It is in the light of 
these developments that one should examine the real gains that organized labor 
derived from links to political parties, rather than assume that they benefit labor. 
4 The Sources of Variations: A Model of Government–Union Interactions 
I argued above that none of the four proposed interpretations can offer a fully sat-
isfactory explanation for the cross-country variations in union effectiveness in na-
tional-level tripartite bargaining in the examined ECE countries. While each of 
these interpretations has specific weaknesses to explain the problem at hand, 
their common drawback is related to their inability to offer a more dynamic 
analysis that would take into account the interplay between institutions and po-
litical processes over time. In the discussion above, I have repeatedly called for 
putting a stronger stress on actors’ strategies in order to understand why very 
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similar tripartite institutions have produced rather different outcomes for organ-
ized labor across ECE. Thus, in addition to the traditional inquiry of how institu-
tions shape actors’ strategies and influence policy outcomes, we have to examine 
how changes in political strategies affect and modify the central institutions that 
govern labor relations. In other words, we need to explore how these institutions 
are used; what ends they serve and for which actors; and finally, how these insti-
tutions evolve and change over time.  
In order to transcend the limitations of the above proposed interpretations, in the 
next section I try to modify some of their elements. Based on this, I sketch a 
model of government-union interactions that could hopefully shed more light on 
the sources of variations in union effectiveness in tripartite negotiations in post-
communist ECE. When discussing different dimensions of the model, I try to re-
late them with relevant empirical findings for the three country cases. For reasons 
of space, however, this discussion is meant to serve only illustrative purposes, 
rather than provide an in-depth analysis of any of the cases.  
4.1 Determinants of Strategies: A Static Picture 
The starting point for understanding the nature of government-union interac-
tions, and ultimately the results of tripartite negotiations, is to identify factors 
that can account for variations in strategies across countries.8 The focus here is 
particularly on government strategies vis-à-vis organized labor, since this actor 
has been relatively stronger and more influential in all ECE countries.9 Nonethe-
less, tactics that unions employ in their dealings with the government, as well as 
the nature of interactions among themselves, are extremely important for they in-
fluence government perceptions of union power. Accordingly, the choice of the 
initial strategies (i.e. at the onset of transition) depends on the balance of power 
between the government and the unions. In turn, this balance of power is affected 
                                                   
8  The focus is on union, and in particular government strategies, in tripartite negotia-
tions. I do not discuss the role of employers associations for two reasons: first, they 
have been the weakest organized actor in tripartite institutions across ECE and have 
usually sided with governments’ proposals, and second, the share of the state sector 
had been rather high, especially in the first half of the 1990s, so that employers asso-
ciations, de facto, represented interests of the state.  
9  Governments had an upper hand in the creation of not only the fundamentals of the 
new market economy, but also in the field of labor relations. As mentioned earlier, 
due to economic constraints, unions could hardly affect the choice of economic poli-
cies. In addition, legacies of socialism not only produced a negative image of trade 
unions, but also incapacitated them in terms of experience to bargain collectively and 
effectively use democratic corporatist mechanisms.  
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by two institutional variables – most notably the organizational structure of un-
ions and the existence of formal union-party links – and a more agency-based 
variable, in particular the mode of inter-union dynamics. 
Following neo-corporatist approaches, the degree of union fragmentation re-
mains an important indicator of union ability to coordinate various demands and 
have a clear bargaining strategy. A single, encompassing union is not only more 
likely to uphold agreements, but, potentially, it also has higher capacity to dis-
rupt the normal functioning of the economy should the government fail to take 
union interests into account. Thus, the existence of such a union structure is ex-
pected to increase the government’s incentive to follow a pragmatic, responsive 
strategy to unions and facilitate their meaningful inclusion in policy making. 
Conversely, in cases of bi-polar or multi-polar models of unionism, the govern-
ment might be less responsive to union demands. However, the union structure 
tells only one part of the story. As I argued above, the choice of strategies is not 
predetermined by institutional structures, but more crucially by the nature of in-
ter-union dynamics. More precisely, rivalry and hostility between unions not 
only increases coordination problems, but also strengthens the government’s po-
sition vis-à-vis organized labor, thus weakening its incentives to cede to labor 
demands. In other words, a high degree of inter-union conflicts can be used by 
the government as an excuse to minimize the role of organized labor in policy 
making. Depending on the specific socio-economic and political context, the gov-
ernment in such cases might either opt for an all-out attack on unions by, say, 
dismantling and weakening national corporatist structures, or it might attempt to 
use specific organizational or political issues to play out the unions against each 
other, thus deepening their division and further reducing their role in policy 
making.  
In addition to the structural and behavioral characteristics of unions, the existence 
of formal union-party ties has to be taken into account to understand the choice 
of strategies. As I argued above, in the context of post-communist ECE, these ties 
are more likely to induce labor sacrifices rather than gains. In cases where unions 
have strong links (in particular) with the governing parties, the government has 
an incentive to try to use these connections to convince union leaders of the ne-
cessity of reforms and policies that might have harmful effects on labor. The in-
clusion of union leaders in the political structures of the state can thus be benefi-
cial for the government. Not only does such a situation empower the government 
with the argument that interests of labor are strongly represented, but it also se-
cures the control over unions by minimizing the possible backlash against re-
forms. By responding to partisan allies, union leaders in effect subordinate the in-
terests of their rank and file. This is why partisan loyalty in post-communist ECE 
promotes the marginalization of labor rather than the strengthening of union 
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power. Conversely, political non-alignment of unions strips the government of 
the possibility to rely on party paternalism as the main strategy towards unions, 
and consequently increases the government’s incentive to utilize more actively 
tripartite mechanisms of policy making. In cases where union structure is frag-
mented and labor is divided by political and ideological differences that are repli-
cated in different party affiliations, inter-party rivalry is expected to be transmit-
ted to the unions, thus weakening their capacity to bargain collectively and obtain 
concessions.  
Specific combinations of these three variables led the first democratic govern-
ments in these three cases to implement rather different strategies vis-à-vis organ-
ized labor. In the Czech Republic, the existence of a unified, encompassing union 
confederation, combined with its insistence on political non-alignment induced 
the government to approach the unions in a more cautious, pragmatic way. Con-
trary to its political predisposition, the center-right government opted for the in-
clusion of unions in the formulation of broader reform principles by means of 
peak-level tripartite negotiations through which unions secured important con-
cessions.  
In Hungary, the existence of a fragmented, pluralistic union structure and union 
divisions that ran across old-new lines, combined with partial links with political 
parties created a more complex situation that can explain initial ambivalence and 
ad-hoc tripartite solutions to labor disputes that resulted in partial concessions to 
the unions. However, growing conflicts between the unions with regard to the 
redistribution of huge assets of the communist union federation – and even a plea 
of some unions that the government should solve the conflicts – empowered the 
government with the information that organized labor was a deeply divided and 
weak actor. Consequently, the government used this opportunity to side with the 
new unions by initiating controversial laws regarding the redistribution of the old 
union assets that were clearly intended to weaken the successor unions.10 How-
ever, this decision had little to do with the government’s genuine wish to help the 
new unions, but rather with an opportunity to benefit from a divide-and-rule strat-
egy (see Bruszt 1995). By preoccupying the unions with organizational issues, the 
                                                   
10  Essentially, the government insisted on redistribution that would provide equal op-
portunities to all unions irrespective of their size. This, in practice, meant diverting 
the assets from MSZOSZ to the new unions. In addition, the government insisted that 
the final decision about the actual redistribution take place during the 1992 negotia-
tions of the tripartite annual agreement. During the negotiations, the government 
agreed to revise the controversial law, so that the asset redistribution be decided ac-
cording to the results of the 1993 social security board and works council elections. 
While the unions were preoccupied with organizing these elections, the government 
unilaterally revised some of the provisions related to economic and social policies in 
the previous tripartite negotiations.  
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government practically reduced their role and effectiveness in the tripartite nego-
tiations of economic and social policies. More importantly, such a strategy pro-
pelled union conflicts, which further eroded the possibility of a solid union coor-
dination and outlining of a common strategy vis-à-vis the government.  
Finally, in Poland, the fragmented, bi-polar union structure combined with the 
extreme ideological animosity between the unions, replicated in their strong for-
mal links with two parties at the opposite sides of the political party spectrum, 
enabled the first Solidarity government to buy union consent to neoliberal re-
forms practically without any concessions. Solidarity union leaders formed the 
core of the government, thus blurring the difference between labor and govern-
ment interests. By implementing party-paternalism as the main strategy, the gov-
ernment managed to get union leaders to sell out the interests of their rank and 
file to partisan allies, effectively subordinating and suffocating what used to be 
perceived as the strongest union in post-communist countries. Hence, the sub-
missiveness of the Solidarity union leadership, and even its support for neoliberal 
dictates, reduced the government’s incentive to support tripartite negotiations 
with organized labor. Moreover, any attempt of the successor unions to criticize 
the reform strategy was dismissed on ideological grounds. This, in turn, started a 
dangerous spiral of inter-union conflicts rooted in different political affiliations.  
The interplay of these three variables explains the choice of strategies at the be-
ginning of transition, and thus the origins of the subsequent state-labor relations. 
However, in order to understand how distinct paths of state-labor relations have 
evolved over time, and how they relate to union effectiveness in tripartite bar-
gaining, the time frame of the analysis has to be extended from the initial period 
of transition to the whole period of transformation.  
4.2 Shaping the Paths: A Dynamic Picture 
Strategies that governments and unions settle on at the beginning of transition do 
not necessarily have to remain the same. As I argued above, the choice of strate-
gies is heavily influenced by interactions among the main actors. Since the very 
term “interaction” presupposes a certain dynamism of the examined relationship, 
it is expected that initial strategies might be occasionally re-evaluated and even 
altered. These instances are generally associated with context-specific socio-
economic and political shifts, such as government changes, a significant deterio-
ration of macro-economic conditions, or wider union protests against specific 
policies. Depending on the nature of these shifts, as well as the balance of power 
vis-à-vis the unions, the government in general can either show more responsive-
ness to organized labor, or opt for strategies aimed at the reduction of union 
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power.11 In relation to the initial strategy, the choice then becomes either “staying 
on course” or “strategy alteration.” 
The choice between these two options, however, is not only affected by the nature 
of macro-economic and political shifts, but also by the form and outcomes of pre-
vious interactions. This is so because actors tend to reflect on their prior experi-
ence and draw lessons from previous episodes of interaction. To put it in a more 
schematic form, the choice of government strategy at tx is affected not only by the 
specific contextual conditions surrounding that moment, but also by the experi-
ence drawn from interactions at tx-1. If, say, government measures that are in-
tended to reduce union power at tx-1 pass without significant opposition from the 
union side, at tx the government is likely to either “stay on course” or attempt to 
marginalize organized labor even further. Conversely, if the union response at tx-1 
is perceived by the government as strong enough to potentially erode the support 
for government policies or threaten the overall political stability, the government 
is likely to alter its strategy and show more responsiveness to union demands at tx. 
For example, after coming to power, the Czech Prime Minister Klaus was not able 
to undertake an all-out attack on unions despite his extremely strong neoliberal 
ideological predisposition, mainly because the previously negotiated wage-
unemployment compromise had given the unions strong legitimacy and secured 
broader public support for tripartism. Instead, Klaus opted for a carrot-and-stick 
strategy (Pollert 1999) with the aim of weakening labor in a gradual way by in-
creasingly dismissing the importance of tripartite agreements and limiting the re-
sponsibilities of the tripartite institution. However, the worsening of economic 
conditions combined with an increasing dismissal of union demands, strength-
ened union assertiveness and resulted in a number of protest actions that gener-
ated considerable public support. These developments, combined with the ero-
sion of the electoral support in 1996, once again changed the balance of power 
and induced Klaus to back down, abandon the carrot-and-stick strategy and 
show more responsiveness to union demands. In an attempt to reach a consensus 
for a new economic package, Klaus offered to revive the original functions of the 
tripartite institution, include the unions in the formulation of general economic 
policies, and strengthen instruments for the extension of collective agreements. 
The experience of the Klaus government was also an important lesson for the new 
social democratic government. By realizing the importance of meaningful tripar-
tite negotiations for the continuation of reforms and preserving social peace, the 
new government’s pragmatic responsiveness resulted in a number of important 
concessions to unions. 
                                                   
11  As the empirical part will show, these strategies can assume various forms in differ-
ent contexts, e.g. pragmatic responsiveness, carrot-and-stick, divide-and-rule, party-
paternalism, all-out attack; etc. 
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In Hungary, the serious macro-economic imbalance induced the Socialist-Liberal 
government to search for new measures immediately after its inauguration in 
1994. Despite the attempts to negotiate a social pact, the government in the end 
introduced a harsh neoliberal package by neglecting the tripartite institution and 
directly relying on its majority in Parliament. While this move was obviously in-
fluenced by the depth of economic crisis, the government undoubtedly benefited 
from the formal links with the largest union, as well as the previous govern-
ment’s divide-and-rule strategy that had deepened inter-union division, which 
ultimately eroded the mobilizational capacity of organized labor. The fact that the 
unions did not mount much opposition to the new economic policies, but had fo-
cused instead on the new inter-organizational conflicts in 1997,12 signaled to the 
subsequent, conservative Orbán government that organized labor was weak and 
unable to act in a unified way. Armed with this “knowledge” as well as the im-
provement of economic conditions, the government opted for an all-out attack on 
unions by means of dismantling and reorganizing the central institution for tri-
partite deliberations and drastically minimizing the role of unions in policy mak-
ing.  
Finally, in Poland, it was the rise of protests against the effects of reforms that in-
duced the government to search for a more labor-responsive strategy in 1993.13 In 
order to restore social peace, the government proposed to negotiate a broader 
pact and institutionalize a tripartite framework of labor relations. However, due 
to the fall of the government, the revised version of the pact was implemented 
only by the subsequent social democratic government. This government learned a 
lesson from its predecessor and initially opted for a more responsive strategy to-
wards the unions by offering small pay concessions, abolishing tax on wage in-
creases, and offering tripartite consultations. However, when political inter-union 
hostility endangered the functioning of this institution, the government did noth-
ing to improve it. Instead – in the face of economic recovery and a reduced likeli-
hood of protests – the government decided to utilize its strong formal links with 
the OPZZ and settled on party paternalism as a means to control labor in policy 
making. Extreme animosity between the unions and the resulting lack of any 
form of unified action for the strengthening of tripartite negotiations, also en-
abled the subsequent conservative government to rely even more heavily on 
party-paternalism as the main strategy towards the unions. 
Government-union interactions therefore evolve through an ongoing assessment 
of the mutual strengths and weaknesses, which then in combination with context-
                                                   
12  The mandate of the self-governing social security bodies expired in 1997, and new in-
ter-union conflicts emerged over the form of reorganization of these bodies.  
13  Protests were initiated from bellow, as well as OPZZ, and only later supported by the 
Solidarity union leadership.  
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specific conditions affect the choice of strategies. The outcomes of negotiations at 
each specific moment – whether they refer to policies, labor legislation, or par-
ticular labor disputes – not only reflect this distribution of power, but also affect 
the nature of subsequent government-union interactions, since the government’s 
responsiveness to union demands partly depends on previous interactions. In this 
way, tripartite institutions that facilitate these negotiations start reflecting a par-
ticular power distribution, which feeds back to subsequent choices by reducing 
the likelihood that weaker actors would be able to achieve substantial gains. In 
other words, if the government repeatedly uses the institution of tripartite delib-
erations only instrumentally, the chances that unions would be able to initiate al-
ternative policies or modify the existing ones are lower with time. Thus, these on-
going strategic interactions within the tripartite institutions shape specific paths 
of state-labor relations, which over time become more resistant to change. These 
paths, in turn, determine the very effectiveness and power of organized labor. 
Hence, it is not the formal rules of tripartite institutions that determine labor out-
comes, but rather the way in which these institutions are used and the goals they 
are supposed to serve. The ongoing strategic interactions between governments 
and unions in a way facilitate gradual modification of tripartite institutions. Con-
sequently, these institutions can become either an indispensable element of the 
policy making framework or only a token gesture on the part of governments that 
effectively facilitate marginalization of organized labor. 
By carefully tracing strategic interactions in the three ECE countries, we can 
clearly see the evolvement of three distinct paths of state-labor relations, which 
influenced the power and effectiveness of organized labor in different ways. In 
Hungary, complex union dynamics combined with frequently changing govern-
ment strategies – from divide-and-rule, over partial political inclusion and unilat-
eralism, to an all-out attack on unions – have accentuated power disparities be-
tween the contending actors in the tripartite institution, and weakened the capac-
ity of organized labor. Although this institution facilitated negotiations over some 
important labor issues at the outset of transition, the ongoing strategic interac-
tions have over time shaped the path of unstable bargaining with a rather low level 
of concessions for organized labor. In Poland, the widely accepted party-
incorporation of unions combined with the highest degree of inter-union conflicts 
has enabled respective governments to marginalize the role of the tripartite insti-
tution and follow largely similar party-paternalism strategy towards the unions, 
which served the purpose of the direct control of labor demands. Such interaction 
has shaped the path of labor cooptation with minimal concessions to the unions, 
which over time became increasingly resistant to change. Finally, in the Czech 
Republic – despite Klaus’s attempt to marginalize the role of the tripartite institu-
tion and weaken organized labor through a carrot-and-stick strategy – the earlier 
constructive incorporation of unions in policy making combined with the ability 
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of the Czech organized labor to show a unified opposition to Klaus’s measures 
helped preserve and further the path of pragmatic institutionalized bargaining. As 
everywhere across post-communist ECE, the transformation process has ad-
versely affected the Czech unions. Nonetheless, staying on the path of pragmatic 
bargaining has preserved the tripartite institution as an indispensable part of the 
policy making machinery through which the unions managed to achieve the rela-
tively highest degree of concessions. 
Any analysis that attempts to trace interactions between actors over time inevita-
bly incorporates variables of a more contingent nature. Hence, one might ask 
whether such frameworks are capable of generating truly testable hypotheses and 
parsimonious conclusions. Because of its focus on the ongoing government-union 
interactions and “path shaping” processes, the framework presented in this paper 
can be charged with a similar criticism. However, without a careful tracing of 
these interactions, it would be hard to discern particular intricacies of each case 
and enhance the dynamic component of the analysis. As Hall (2003: 387) put it, 
when “political outcomes depend not on a few socio-economic conditions but on 
complex chains of strategic interaction, they cannot be explained except by refer-
ence to that chain.”  
Relying on such a method, however, usually means employing small-N compari-
sons. A standard objection raised against such analyses is that they are unable to 
offer propositions that can be generalized. Yet, this does not mean that they do 
not produce theoretical gains. As Rueschemeyer (2003) convincingly argues, 
problem-driven small-N comparisons are capable of not only disputing standard 
theories, but also of generating new hypotheses, offering useful conceptualiza-
tions and producing “testable explanatory propositions” (see also Ebbinghaus 
2003; Mahoney 2003). The framework developed in this paper suggests three ex-
planatory variables that influence the choice of initial strategies. In this way, it 
enables a relatively simple testing of the proposed hypotheses on other ECE 
cases.14 While the examination of the evolution of specific paths of state-labor re-
                                                   
14  Preliminary evidence indicates that the three variables proposed by the model were 
also relevant for government-union interactions in other ECE countries at the outset 
of transition. For instance, in the case of Bulgaria, the bi-polar union structure organ-
ized around old-new divisions and the existence of formal ties to opposing political 
parties proved to be a disadvantage for the unions. Even though both confederations 
cut their formal links with political parties as early as 1991, ideological divisions as-
sociated with these ties had influenced inter-union dynamics and enabled the gov-
ernment to use the issue of the redistribution of the old union’s assets as a major 
component of its divide-and-rule strategy at the outset of transition. Similarly, in 
Romania the fragmented union structure, combined with ideological differences and 
partial links with political parties produced labor disunity and weakened the capac-
ity to outline a common strategy. By passing the 1991 Trade Union Act that further 
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lations would obviously require a more elaborate tracing of actors’ interactions 
within context-specific conditions and over time, the suggested framework could 
nonetheless serve as a guideline for such an exercise. 
5 Conclusions 
This paper has demonstrated that traditional economic-structural arguments, 
democratization literature arguments, and political cycle arguments cannot take 
us far in explaining variations in the outcomes of tripartite-level bargaining in 
ECE. In addition, I have argued that variations in union effectiveness cannot be 
attributed solely to institutional variables, and that closer attention has to be paid 
to interactions between the main actors. In order to more systematically analyze 
government-union interactions in post-communist ECE, the paper offers a 
framework that combines institutional and behavioral variables, and proposes a 
set of hypotheses regarding the choice of strategies.15 I have tried to show how in 
the three examined country-cases these ongoing strategic interactions have 
shaped distinct paths of state labor relations – pragmatic bargaining, unstable bar-
gaining, and cooptation – which in different ways influenced the effectiveness of 
unions in tripartite bargaining. The manner in which these distinct paths have 
evolved has been largely conditioned by the ongoing mutual assessments of 
strengths and weaknesses between the contending actors.  
                                                                                                                                                  
encouraged inter-union competition and rupture, the government showed the intent 
to follow a divide-and-rule strategy. In addition, union-party connections, or the af-
filiation of some union leaders with political parties, provided the room for infiltra-
tion and cooptation experiments. In Croatia, the first nationalist/conservative gov-
ernment used its ties with the new union confederation in order to counterbalance re-
formed union which advocated social-democratic values. Like in Poland, the gov-
ernment followed the strategy of party paternalism by transforming its union leaders 
into “advocates of patience” in the face of national exigency associated with the war. 
By accusing the reformed unions of allegedly unpatriotic values and unrealistic eco-
nomic demands, the government precluded union input in policy making, and effec-
tively silenced both labor and political opposition at the outset of transition. In con-
trast, in Latvia, the existence of a single reformed union confederation that insisted 
on its political independence, induced the first democratic government to act prag-
matically and initiate broader negotiations with labor that were aimed to mitigate 
negative effects of the reforms. 
15  For a related argument that actors’ choices might not be determined solely by institu-
tional structures, but also heavily influenced by interactive games among actors, see 
Regini’s (2000) analysis of divergent responses of European economies to globaliza-
tion pressures.  
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Consequently, this paper has important implications for theorizing about path-
dependency of political processes. By tracing how power asymmetries further 
specific paths, the analysis broadly corresponds to the “power mechanism” of 
path reproduction, but it also diverges from it in an important aspect. In this view 
(see Mahoney 2000), the reproduction of certain political and policy trajectories is 
explained by power asymmetries that are inherent to specific institutions. Institu-
tions do not only embody power asymmetries but they also reinforce the power 
of stronger actors, thus furthering an existing path until some strong exogenous 
shock disturbs the very foundations of institutions, leading to their replacement 
and setting of a new path. The problem with this argument, I believe, is that it 
pushes aside the analysis of how broader extra-institutional shifts – that do not 
necessarily qualify as major exogenous shocks – influence actors’ strategies and 
the subsequent distribution of power that affects the very functioning of institu-
tions. In other words, power asymmetries are not necessarily “frozen” from the 
time of the institutional formation until the complete institutional replacement. 
Indeed, as my analysis shows, if the distribution of power is determined purely 
by institutions, then trade unions in ECE would have fared much better since 
formal requirements of tripartite institutions assigned them a considerable lever-
age over the formulation of socio-economic policies. Instead, I demonstrate that 
power asymmetries between governments and unions are not “frozen,” but 
rather shaped through ongoing interactions within the tripartite institutions. By 
putting more stress on agency, its reflexive properties (Emirbayer/Mische 1998; 
Hay/Wincott 1998), and conflicts that develop within relevant institutions, this 
analysis emphasizes the dynamism of political processes that is often neglected in 
more rigid path-dependency accounts.  
Because of its emphasis on the dynamic components of the analysis, this paper 
also contributes to the wider debate on institutional evolution and change (Alex-
ander 2001; Pierson 2001; Thelen 2003). In particular, the model of government-
union interactions indicates a mechanism through which endogenous forces – 
and not only major external shocks – might gradually alter institutional arrange-
ments. Throughout the paper I have tried to show how actors respond to changes 
in socio-economic and political contexts by adjusting their strategies, and how 
these continuing strategic interactions affect and gradually modify the very insti-
tutions within which these interactions evolve, so that they can start serving 
rather different goals and purposes.16 More precisely, I have used the case of 
                                                   
16  This type of institutional modification broadly corresponds to the mechanism of 
institutional conversion, elaborated by Thelen (2003). According to her, the 
conversion – as a mechanism of institutional change – refers to processes that “can be 
set in motion by a shift in the environment that confronts actors with new problems 
that they address by using existing institutions in new ways or in service of new 
goals” (2003: 228).  
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post-communist institutions of tripartite deliberations to demonstrate how over 
time both governments and unions have been reacting to broader socio-economic 
and political shifts by re-evaluating and adjusting their strategies while taking 
into account mutual strengths and weaknesses at particular moments. These re-
sponses, in turn, have modified the tripartite institutions in a way that they either 
became an essential part of the policy making process or an institution of mar-
ginal importance. In other words, the paper shows that the political maneuvering 
within the tripartite institutions has over time subtly altered particular institu-
tional parameters (e.g. their form and functions), thus affecting subsequent policy 
outcomes. In this way, originally very similar national tripartite institutions have 
served different functions and over time produced rather diverse outcomes 
across respective national contexts. 
By indicating mechanisms that drive such incremental modification of tripartite 
institutional arrangements, this paper suggests one possible way to analyze a 
complicated logic of institutional change. At the same time, however, it raises 
some important questions for further conceptual work. In particular, it invokes 
the question of whether path-dependent processes are such because of the spe-
cific constraints imposed by institutional structures, or because of the logic of par-
ticular processes that largely rests on the ability of agency to perpetuate certain 
type of interaction, and thus sustain and further paths that are based on power 
asymmetries. In other words, if particular political and policy outcomes are heav-
ily dependent on specific balances of societal power, are institutions true causes 
of these outcomes as traditional path-dependency arguments claim, or are they 
effects of the ongoing struggle between the contending actors? This question is 
particularly relevant in the transitional contexts, where it is often not entirely 
clear how credible and firm actors find institutional constraints. As Alexander 
(2001: 252, 266) demonstrates in a number of cases of democratic consolidation, 
when actors perceive institutions as “anything but ‘locked in’” and correspond-
ingly “regularly treat them as effects, our ability to treat them as causes is circum-
scribed.” Hence, it is the task of future work to conceptualize more clearly the 
various ways through which institutions gradually evolve and change. The 
analysis presented here provides one step in this direction. 
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